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POLICY BRIEF

SEPTEMBER 2015

Prospects for Economic Growth
in Punjab under Alternative
Demographic Scenarios
The Case for a Rapid Fertility Decline
Future economic growth is likely to be closely linked,
if not driven, by how rapidly fertility declines further.
Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
While economic growth in Pakistan has averaged 3 percent
over the past decade, Vision 2025 envisages it to be over 8
percent between 2018 and 2025. This ambitious target is
echoed in the Punjab Growth Strategy 2018, which aims to
achieve it by promoting private-sector led and export-oriented economic activity through investments in areas such as
institutional and governance reforms, human capital development, improved urban planning, and effective security. Both
Vision 2025 and the Punjab Growth Strategy acknowledge
that a large and rapidly growing population could hamper
growth by pulling investments away from productivity development towards expanding needs for education, health, housing, and other infrastructure. However, they also recognize
that inherent within the population challenge is a potentially
tremendous opportunity to boost economic growth.
Punjab is currently undergoing a demographic transition from
a situation of high fertility and high mortality to one of lower fertility and mortality (Figure 1). The resulting bulge in its

working-age population means the province is poised to reap
a “demographic dividend”—the boost in income per capita
and its growth that accrues when the share of working age
individuals in a population rises relative to dependents, resulting in a higher support ratio,1 as well as increased labor
supply and savings. As the Asian Tigers have demonstrated, a robust working-age population can serve as a potent,
real world pathway for achieving economic growth. However,
harnessing the powerful thrust of the demographic dividend
requires the timely execution of a well-conceived plan of action involving major interventions in the education, health
(including reproductive health/population welfare), and labor
sectors.
Encouragingly, both Vision 2025 and the Punjab Growth
Strategy 2018 show a strong focus on enhancing the productive potential of the current and future work force through investments in education, skills development, and job creation.
However, while the need to reduce population growth is recog-
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nized intuitively, there is relatively low awareness
that the speed at which fertility declines now in
Punjab will have a huge impact on the magnitude
of the economic boost it is able to reap from the
demographic dividend. A recent study of prospects
for economic growth in Pakistan under alternative
demographic scenarios quantified the massive differences in growth that can be achieved with slow,
moderate and rapid fertility decline in Punjab.2 This
brief presents the study’s key findings to facilitate
a deeper understanding of the connection between
the speed of fertility decline and the size of the demographic dividend, and the scale of the economic
gains at stake.

“The need for lowering the growth
rate of population is more urgent
than ever.”
VISION 2025

TA B L E 1: PRO J EC TED D EMO GRA PH IC S A ND EC O NO MIC GROW T H
IN PUNJA B IN 2050 WITH S LOW, MO D ERATE, AN D
RA PID F ERTIL IT Y D EC L INE

Scenario 1
Slow Fertility
Decline

Scenario 2
Moderate
Fertility Decline

Scenario 3
Rapid Fertility
Decline

Assume TFR

Remains 0.5
births higher
than the moderate decline
assumption

Declines steadily to 2.1 births
per woman by
2050

Remains 0.5
births lower
than the moderate decline
assumption

Total
Population

183.6 million

172.8 million

162.5 million

Support ratio

1.61

1.76

1.93

Per capita GDP
Growth

333%

378%

431%

Demographic
Dividend

122%

168%

221%

Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015

FERTILITY DECLINE AND
PROSPECTS OF A DEMOGRAPHIC
DIVIDEND IN PUNJAB
As fertility declines in Punjab, the rate of growth in the lowest
tiers of its population pyramid (ages 0-14) is slowing down.
However, due to the momentum of past high fertility and current improvements in infant and child survival, there will not
be an appreciable change in the rate of growth of the working-age population for perhaps two decades. In proportion to
dependents, the working-age share of the total population is
rising.
To assess the effect of this rising support ratio on future
economic growth, Bloom, Chen and Sathar (2015) employed
state-of-the-art theoretical and statistical models designed
to capture the complexity of economic growth processes and
their interactions with demographic trends specific to the Pakistani context. The model is outlined in Box 1. Projections of
the total population were generated for three fertility decline
scenarios—moderate decline in the total fertility rate (TFR)
from the current level of 3.8 to replacement fertility (TFR
2.1) in 2050;3 slow decline in TFR, which would mean that
replacement fertility is reached sometime after 2050; and
rapid decline in TFR, implying that replacement fertility is attained before 2050. For population projections, the base year
was 1998, when the last census was conducted, while 2011
was taken as the base year for the per capita income and
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demographic dividend comparison. The results of the study
for Punjab are summarized in Table 1.
As shown in Figure 2, depending on the speed of fertility decline, the population of Punjab could grow to 184 million or to
162 million by 2050. Compared to a scenario of rapid fertility
decline, slow fertility decline implies approximately 15 million
more young dependents in the population. This will translate
into a lower support ratio—1.61, as against 1.93 with rapid
fertility decline (Table 1).
A higher support ratio represents an increase in the productive capacity of the economy on a per capita basis, which creates the prospect of a spurt in economic growth—the demographic dividend. To maximize the size of the demographic
dividend, the support ratio must be maintained at optimal
levels while the “boom” in the working-age population lasts.
Fertility must decline as much as possible to raise the support ratio, and as fast as possible to allow the high support
ratio to prevail over a longer period. Figure 3 presents the
historical and prospective trend in Punjab’s support ratio and
how it is affected by the pace of fertility decline. Notably, the
support ratio started to rise in the late 1990s—when energetic efforts were made to increase uptake of family planning—
but it is now beginning to plateau. It can be expected to rise
significantly if a moderate or rapid pace of fertility decline is
achieved.
Differences in the support ratio, in turn, lead to wide divergences in the per capita GDP growth attainable (Figure 4).
In 2050, per capita income in Punjab is expected to be

F IGURE 2: PROJE C TE D PO PU L ATIO N G ROW TH IN
PU NJA B W ITH S LOW, MO D E RATE , AND
R A PI D FERTIL IT Y D E C L IN E

about $4,000 if fertility persists at current levels; a little over
$5,500, if fertility declines slowly; and about $6,800, if fertility drops rapidly.

Population (millions)

This means that if the fertility rate continues to hover in the
current vicinity of 3.8, Punjab’s GDP per capita will only be
about 210 percent greater in 2050 than it is today; however, if the TFR declines rapidly, Punjab’s GDP per capita could
grow by as much as 431 percent. In other words, a precipitous decline in fertility could boost income in Punjab by 221
percent over current levels, independent of any additional income growth that occurs over this horizon. By comparison, a
slow decline in fertility would lead to a 122 percent boost in
income, which, significant as it is, represents only about half
of the dividend achievable.
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F IGURE 3: H I S T OR I CAL TRE N D S A N D P RO J E C TED
GROW T H IN PU N JA B ’ S SUPPO RT RATIO
W I T H SLOW, MO D E RATE , AN D RA PID
FE R T ILI T Y D E C L IN E

The results show that, overall, for every one unit of decrease
in the total fertility rate, GDP per capita is expected to increase by 90-100 percent. Further fertility decline is going to
be associated with a rise in per capita income, but the level of
benefits to be accrued will multiply if there is a serious effort
at interventions that speed up the decline while the support
ratio is elevated. This is a strong economic argument for investing in a more rapid fertility decline in the province.

“Our Vision today is to make Pakistan
the next Asian Tiger.”
VISION 2025

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
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By 2050, Punjab’s per capita income will be 210 percent
higher than today’s levels if there is no decline in fertility, but
431 percent higher if fertility declines rapidly. The scale and
effectiveness of efforts to reduce fertility levels in Punjab will
determine whether per capita income in the province grows
by 333 percent or by 431 percent by 2050. The possible demographic dividend of a 221 percent increase in per capita
income is simply too huge to be ignored in economic growth
strategy, especially given Punjab’s burgeoning population,
resource constraints, and development aspirations. The findings presented in this brief show clearly that, if Punjab is to
harness the demographic dividend, planners must invest at
least as heavily and urgently in efforts to raise the contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) as in interventions to educate,
train and productively employ the youth bulge.
Time is of the essence. The demographic dividend is a limited-time offer, and once fertility reaches replacement levels,
the demographic transition model predicts some semblance
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of equilibrium between fertility and mortality levels. By 2040,
the bulge that is currently in the working-age tiers will have
progressed through to older tiers of the pyramid, while a reduced population of young people will have entered Punjab’s
work force. Accordingly, the support ratio will decline and the
dividend window will close.

need for family planning, which is estimated at 18 percent,
and represents an opportunity for a rapid demand-driven
increase in Punjab’s CPR from the current level of 41 percent to 59 percent. This alone will reduce the TFR from 3.8
to the wanted level of fertility of 2.8 (PDHS 2013). In comparison, the Punjab government’s FP2020 goal of raising the
CPR to 55 percent by 2020 will reduce the TFR to 2.9. While
increased investment in family planning will be entailed in
eliminating unmet need, and further efforts will be needed to
ensure a continuation of the rapid fertility decline trajectory,
the costs are more than justified by the substantially large
economic boost achievable.

“The speed at which fertility declines now
in Punjab will determine the magnitude of
the economic boost it will experience.”
Punjab must act fast to lower its TFR and maintain a high
support ratio through what is left of the dividend period. The
process can be kick-started by focusing on eliminating unmet

END NOTES
(1) The support ratio expresses the proportion of working-age individuals relative
to dependents in the population. It is defined here as the working age population
(15-59) divided by the non-working age population (<15 or>59 years). (2) D. E.
Bloom, S. Chen and Z. Sathar, “Prospects for economic growth in Pakistan under
alternative demographic scenarios” (Population Council, Islamabad). (3) The TFR
measures the average number of children expected to be borne by every woman
in a population during her lifetime. The model’s TFR assumptions for the three
fertility decline scenarios are indicated in Table 1.

BOX 1: M OD E L U S E D TO P RO J E C T PRO SPE C T S FO R
E C ONOM IC G ROW TH U N D E R ALTE RN ATIVE
D E M OGR A PH IC SC E N A RIO S

GDP growth estimations in the model follow the convergence model proposed by Barro (2004). The final multiple regression growth
equation is derived by manipulating the Solow growth model and states the determinants of the growth of income per capita.

α

yt = −αyt + βwt + αwt + δlt + ηT Xt + €t

Yt

Where yt = log(Pt ) (Y is aggregate income), w = log(Yt
Lt ) (L is labor force) and Xt denotes time-variant control variables other than demographic variables.
The model assumes Sindh’s total fertility rate, which currently stands at about 3.9 children per woman, will decline to the long-run
replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The model also assumes that life expectancy in Sindh will increase to 69 years by 2050.
To test the sensitivity to fertility rates, three fertility decline scenarios are considered:
1.

Moderate fertility decline (Medium Variant), which assumes that the TFR declines at a steady pace and reaches replacement
level (2.1 births per women) by 2050.

2.

Rapid fertility decline (Low Variant), which assumes that TFR is 0.5 births lower than under the medium fertility (1.6 births per
woman) assumption throughout.

3.

Slow fertility decline (High Variant), which assumes that the TFR is 0.5 births higher than under the medium fertility (2.6 births
per woman) assumption throughout.

An indicator “IDD” is introduced, which measures the relative size of demographic dividend and is defined as
IDDi =

yi2050 – y02050
.
y2011

Where yi2050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 under scenario i, y02050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 in base case scenario and y2011 is the
GDP in the staring year.
Source: Derived from Bloom, Chen, and Sathar (2015).
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